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Abstract In this article, we assert that developing countries are much better prepared to
undertake negotiations at the Conference of the Parties in Paris (CoP21) as compared to
CoP15 in Copenhagen. An important element of this is the accumulation of knowledge with
respect to the implications of climate change and the ongoing internalization thereof by key
institutions in developing countries. The articles in this special issue set forth a set of technical
contributions to this improved understanding. We also summarize five major lessons related to
uncertainty, extreme events, timing of impacts, the inseparability of the development and
climate agendas, and the rate of assimilation of climate and development information in key
institutions. They are drawn from the Development Under Climate Change (DUCC) project
carried out by UNU-WIDER of which the countries of the Greater Zambeze Valley formed a
part. Finally, we outline three areas for future research.
1 Introduction
In December 2009, the 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (CoP) to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change took place in Copenhagen Denmark. During the run
up to CoP15, both of the authors of this introductory article were professors in the Department of
Economics at the University of Copenhagen with long established interests in development issues
and emerging interests in climate change, especially the implications of climate change for
development trajectories and strategies. CoP15 promised to pay particular attention to develop-
ment issues, not least the complications added by climate change to the already arduous
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development challenges facing these countries in general and low income countries in particular.
As such, the impending CoP15 negotiations were impossible for us to ignore.
Over the course of 2009, our assessment of the likelihood of success of CoP15 became
increasingly pessimistic. This pessimism was certainly not uniquely harbored in ourselves. For
example, a November 8 2009 article in Time magazine questioned in the headline: BIs there
any hope for agreement at Copenhagen?^ However, our particular concerns were rooted in our
cumulative observations as development professionals considering the implications of climate
change in progressively greater detail. Simply put, not enough was known about climate
change and its implications for development trajectories and strategies to permit effective
negotiation. This was, in our view, true across the full slate of negotiating parties. To be sure,
developed country negotiators were well versed in the latest climate science and, at a
minimum, had access to the latest thinking on the implications of climate for developing
countries. However, this latter information base was, at the time, at best poorly developed and
highly fragmentary. Even in major international institutions concerned with development
issues, the process of assimilating the existing information was in initial stages.
More importantly, the existing (inadequate) information base had barely begun to penetrate
key decision-making units within developing countries. In particular, rigorous analysis of the
implications of climate change for overall growth and development prospects was essentially
not present, much less comprehensively debated and internalized, in any country of which we
were aware. This was, in our view, deeply problematic. One wondered how developing
countries could effectively negotiate before key decision-making institutions within those
countries had really even begun to come to grips with the issues.
In contrast to CoP15, we view the upcoming CoP21 negotiations with guarded optimism.
Once again, there are many sources for this more positive outlook including the offer style
negotiation format and the recent announcement of commitments from China and the United
States. We also believe that considerable progress in understanding the implications of climate
change for development trajectories and for development strategies ranks as a major contrib-
utor. This is to the credit of tens of thousands of people working in thousands of institutions
within nearly all of the countries on the globe. As emphasized above, the information needs
not only to be present; it must also be debated and internalized.
The subsequent articles in this special issue set forth a set of technical contributions to this
improved understanding. These contributions stem from the Development Under Climate
Change (DUCC) project undertaken by the World Institute for Development Economics
Research of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER). The DUCC program was a direct
result of the observations described above. Under DUCC, detailed country level analysis,
focused on growth and development prospects, in countries containing the Zambeze River
Valley (ZRV) as well as in Ethiopia, Ghana, South Africa, Tanzania and Vietnam.
Here, in this introductory article, we focus on some of the major lessons that have been
learned since CoP15, including thoughts on how these lessons are being incorporated into
ongoing development policy thinking at the country level. While the articles in this issue focus
on the countries of the ZRV, we draw here not only upon this experience but also on
experience accumulated in work in the other countries mentioned just above as well as the
extant literature. As such, this introductory article departs from the practice of principally
summarizing/synthesizing the articles in the special issue. The final article in this special issue
undertakes this task alongside the presentation of new information.
The remainder of this introductory article is structured as follows. Section 2 considers five major
lessons. These relate to uncertainty, extreme events, timing of impacts, the inseparability of the
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development and climate agendas, and the rate of assimilation of climate and development
information in key institutions. The final section, 3, proposes three priority areas for future research.
2 Lessons learned
2.1 Uncertainty
In the run up to CoP15 in Copenhagen, it was relatively common to encounter high level
officials within governments, particularly in developing countries, who would express serious
concern that the wetter (dryer) future forecasted by one climate modeling group would be
directly contradicted by a dryer (wetter) forecast from a subsequent climate modeling group.
As shown by Schlosser and Strzepek in this volume (amongst others), the sign of precipitation
changes at relatively small scales (such as a country) can typically not be projected with a high
degree of confidence. Hence, while forecasts of temperature increase over time are very robust
outputs from climate models, planners and policymakers, including private sector actors, must
confront a frequently broad range of precipitation uncertainty across projected climate futures.
This uncertainty in terms of precipitation is an unsettling reality worldwide and particularly
in developing countries, where large shares of the population rely upon agriculture for
livelihoods. The internalization of this uncertainty by developing country decision-makers is
obviously a good thing. It goes a long way to avoiding the possibility that a country, or agents
within a country, will spend considerable resources preparing for a dryer (wetter) future when a
wetter (dryer) future may in fact be in the offing. Communication of uncertainty at a basic level
can be achieved by analyzing a limited number of climate projections with certain properties.
For example, World Bank (2010) [published after CoP15] presents detailed analyses for a
series of countries based on four general circulation models. These four projections were taken
on the basis of their global properties for temperature and precipitation change.
This is clearly a step in the right direction in comparison with the analysis of only one
potential climate future, which is unlikely to be correct. Even on the basis of a handful of
projections, the logic behind robust or even ‘no regret’ climate policy responses, as discussed
by Hallegatte (2009) among others, can be fairly easily discerned. At the same time, reliance
on a set of arbitrarily selected climate scenarios, with each one described as ‘equally unlikely’,
also has obvious limitations. In particular, the selection of climate scenarios is unlikely to
delineate the support of the potential impact distribution. It also provides no sense of where,
within the support of the distribution, probabilities are likely to concentrate.
The articles in this special issue are particularly concerned with the conversion of uncer-
tainty into risk, where both terms are employed with the meanings defined by Knight (1921).
Used in this sense, uncertainty refers to a situation where the probability of a particular
outcome, and perhaps even the support of the distribution of outcomes, is not known. Risk,
on the other hand, is characterized as a situation whereby the distribution of potential outcomes
is known and the actual outcome is not. Hence, the upcoming turn of a fair and known roulette
wheel is risky, but not uncertain.
A common concern voiced with respect to the estimation and presentation of distributions of
climate, biophysical, and economic outcomes is that decision-makers, particularly politicians, will
be incapable of understanding them. It is, of course, quite possible to find politicians with either an
inability or unwillingness to grapple with ranges of potential outcomes. However, in our
experience, decision-makers are frequently very comfortable with ranges of outcomes,
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particularly when the sources of variation are explained honestly and succinctly. And, this comfort
level tends to rise as one ascends the decision-making hierarchy (though this is certainly not an
iron rule). The reason, in our view, is that politicians and others confront decision-making under
uncertainty every day. Hence, the challenge is one of communication rather than concept.
While communication of distributions of outcomes once they have been estimated is not
that difficult, the actual technical task of converting climate, biophysical, and economic
outcomes from uncertainty to risk is challenging. This is amply illustrated in the five
articles that follow in this special issue. At the same time, the process of doing so brings
other advantages. In particular, the conversion of uncertainty to risk implies specifying the
support of the distribution of potential outcomes. A purposeful attempt to define the
support of the distribution of outcomes is qualitatively different from multiple efforts to
estimate mean, mode, or median outcomes (i.e., those within the center of the distribution).
Efforts to specifically target the tails of the distribution of outcomes would logically be
more likely to unearth low probability and high impact possibilities. It is to these possi-
bilities that we now turn.
2.2 Extreme events
As discussed by Weitzman (2011), the characterization of the distribution of potential climate
outcomes as ‘fat-tailed’ has potentially profound implications for decision-making with respect
to climate change. There may be strong rationales for taking action today to avoid low
probability, high impact events in the future, in much the same way that homeowners typically
purchase insurance to counter the possibility of extreme events such as fire. Characterization of
the tails of distributions is difficult empirically because, by definition, the number of obser-
vations that one has to work with is relatively small. Hence, consideration of the tails of
distributions is bound to remain an active area of research, as will be discussed in section 3.
Nevertheless, even on the relatively short time scales considered in this special issue,
consideration of extreme outcomes, such as droughts, floods, and cyclone strike, is of strong
interest. In the articles that follow as well as in country cases considered elsewhere (e.g., Arndt
et al. 2014; 2015; CIEM 2012), magnification, due to climate change, of the probability and/or
the severity of extreme events frequently generates a longish negative tail in the distribution of
socio-economic outcomes (items such as GDP, agricultural production, and hydropower
output). For developing countries concerned with prospects for economic growth, events that
interfere with long run accumulation processes are particularly pernicious as small changes in
growth rates eventually accumulate to big changes in outcomes.
For example, as discussed in this special issue, magnification of the intensity/severity of
flooding events in Mozambique, a widespread coastal country traversed by numerous rivers,
could repeatedly destroy road stocks and other infrastructure with negative implications for
growth. For Malawi, a similar flooding effect is generated though to a lesser degree because
Malawi is a highland that is not downstream and because of greater population densities
resulting in a denser road network characterized by a lower degree of criticality.1 In Vietnam,
the combination of densely populated and very low lying river deltas, sea level rise, and
cyclone strike substantially magnifies the probability of highly damaging storm surges (CIEM
2012). These possibilities should enter the calculus of decision-making today.
1 In contrast, in Mozambique, there is currently only one road linking the Northern, Central, and Southern
regions of the country.
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In South Africa, a series of factors including (i) elevation of much of the country, (ii) lower flood
risk, (iii) robust road networks, (iv) a relatively small share of capital exposed to storm surge, and (v)
an intricate water supply system that permits transfer of water across river basins, generally leads to
fairly muted impacts of climate change on overall economic growth. This includes a relatively small
‘bad tail’ associated with the distribution of these growth outcomes. Rather than at the aggregate
level, extreme negative outcomes in South Africa occur in regions or sectors that may be especially
vulnerable to particular sets of climate outcomes (Arndt et al. 2015). Once again, these extremes and
their implications are among the more policy relevant findings of the analyses conducted thus far.
2.3 Timing
For the purposes of decision-making, the timing of impacts is of obvious relevance. Across all of
the countries considered under DUCC, we find limited impacts on growth as a consequence of
climate change in the relatively near term—over the next decade and a half and perhaps beyond.
The combination of long time scales (at least in human terms) and high levels of uncertainty with
respect to many climate outcomes leads naturally to the concept of development as adaptation. As
has been emphasized elsewhere (e.g., World Bank 2010), the flexibilities afforded by human
capital and functional institutions may be the best possible current adaptation strategy. These
elements are also cornerstones of contemporary development strategy. Hence, in many ways, the
prospect of climate change adaptation frequently serves to reinforce the development imperative.
This is, however, not true in all ways. An excellent example comes from outside of ZRV, in
Vietnam. As noted above, the combination of densely populated and low lying river deltas, sea
level rise, and cyclone strike present a clear and increasing threat. This is true even if the historical
frequency and severity of cyclone strike remains unchanged. This is so because the platform
afforded by sea level rise dramatically increases the area at risk of inundation from storm surge
(Neumann et al. 2012).With continued sea level rise, Vietnamwill eventually face serious choices
with respect to their river deltas, not least the Mekong. However, policies introduced today can
help to channel future economic growth towards less vulnerable zones. If done deliberately and
carefully, these kinds of adaptation policies could significantly reduce the share of economic
activity at risk in the latter half of the 21st century at little to no growth cost (CIEM 2012).
Another example prevails almost everywhere. Road pavement mixes are chosen to with-
stand certain maximum temperature thresholds. As the frequency and severity of extreme heat
events are robustly expected to increase, changes to these mixes are in order. Because the
design life of paved roads are frequently 20 years or more, it makes sense to consider future
temperature rises in road design today. Changes in design standards to cope with changes in
precipitation and/or the frequency/severity of flooding events are somewhat less straightfor-
ward due to the uncertainties inherent in changes in precipitation. Nevertheless, they are
another example of a consideration that very rationally should enter into development calculus
as a consequence of forecasted climate change.
2.4 Inseparability of the development and climate agendas
One important upshot of the discussion from the preceding three subsections is the insepara-
bility of the development and climate agendas. In the subsection on timing presented above,
we covered three illustrations of adaptation. The first simply poses development as an
excellent form of adaptation. The second refers to the geographic pattern of economic growth
as it pertains to Vietnam and the risk of storm surge. And, the third considers design standards
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for roads. Of these, none fall within the purview of ministries of environment (where a great
deal of effort with respect to climate change adaptation is often nonetheless concentrated).
Only one, road design, falls principally within the purview of a technical ministry. The
remaining two illustrations fall principally within the purview of the central strategic resource
allocating bodies within government, typically ministries of economics and finance.
The importance of the central allocating organs only increases when one adds the mitigation
challenge on top of the adaptation challenges. In short, major investment and policy decisions
being made today will be major determinants of the robustness/vulnerability of the society in
mid-century and beyond, when the impacts are widely expected to become more severe.
Importantly, the collective sum of decisions on emissions will eventually determine the
severity of impact.
The central allocating bodies of governments are, as a result, absolutely critical; and it is here
that, in our view, significant progress has been made. As noted, in 2009, very few central
allocating organs in developing countries contained people with more than a cursory under-
standing of climate change issues and their implications for decision-making. This has changed.
We know our own experience best and can report substantial engagement with central minis-
tries in a wide array of countries. In addition, rather than just provide reports and results, we
have increasingly been able to provide systems, tools, and training such that local analysts,
often incorporating locally developed models, undertake the majority of the analysis.2 The
process has been two-way in that governments have reached out and the research community
has responded. The result is that many developing country governments are in a far better
position to actually negotiate.
2.5 The state of assimilation of climate information broadly defined
Overall, the situation is improved yet not necessarily good— hence the guarded optimism. For
example, with respect to the notion of inseparability in focus in the preceding subsection,
substantial momentum still exists to treat climate change as a distinct and separable problem.
Climate finance is perhaps the best illustration of this momentum. Even as the need for
‘mainstreaming’ climate adaptation and mitigation is increasingly recognized, climate finance
is becoming increasingly fractured with a large number of funds and vehicles coming into
existence, often with particular objectives.3 More broadly, decisions from recent CoP meetings
continue to emphasize a distinction between climate finance as new and additional to other
forms of finance even though this distinction cuts directly against mainstreaming (Ayers and
Huq 2009) and despite very substantial conceptual and practical problems to maintaining the
distinction at all (Arndt 2015).
More generally, given the complexity of the issues and the breadth of their implications, the
process of assimilating climate issues into mainstream decision-making is bound to take a long
time. The experience of international organizations is illustrative in this regard. One of the
authors was involved in the World Bank’s Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change study
and the Green Growth report, part of the African Development Report series, for the African
Development Bank. Flagship documents such as these always pose challenges; nevertheless,
these reports posed particular difficulties due, in significant measure, to the relative lack of a
conventional wisdom upon which to build.
2 See http://www1.wider.unu.edu/climateresearch/ and http://www1.wider.unu.edu/ducc/
3 See www.climatefundsupdate.org for summary information on existing funds. Also see UNU-WIDER (2014).
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The same holds true for developing country governments. There remains a tremendous
amount to do almost everywhere. Returning to CoP21, it is (we hope) not the case that
every country needs to achieve a sophisticated assimilation threshold before the negotia-
tions can succeed. Under the offer system currently envisioned for the negotiations, leading
countries can have significant influence. So, the very substantial progress realized over the
past 6 years in, for example, South Africa has the potential to generate overall positive
momentum.
3 Future research
To finish, we identify three areas of future research. The first of these mainly highlights a set of
particularly pertinent issues related to the analysis of impacts and adaptation drawn from the
articles in this special issue. The remaining two are more forward looking and focus on (i)
world prices for fossil fuels and (ii) the relative competitiveness of developing countries,
particularly those in Africa, under a serious global mitigation regime.
With respect to impacts and adaptation, continued focus on extreme events represents an
obvious priority. From historical experience in the ZRV, it is clear that flood events can be
devastating. At the same time, flood modeling is challenging due to time and location
specificities while signals from climate models tend to be coarse both spatially and
temporally. There is a need for revisiting these issues particularly in light of the relatively
large impacts generated. In addition, recent research by Lobell et al. (2013) identifies heat
threshold effects for maize production in the United States. It is important to learn more about
the nature of these threshold effects for crops grown in developing countries. The existence of
similar threshold effects across multiple crops in developing areas could imply a more rapid
onset of serious negative implications for crop production. Other important future research
areas are listed within the individual articles of this special issue.
Second, with respect to prices for fossil fuels, the work of Paltsev (2012) deserves to be
followed up. As shown by Paltsev, serious global mitigation tends strongly to drive down
fossil fuel prices (with the exception of natural gas which experiences a temporary rise before
declining). This is logical and highly relevant to low income countries, particular in Africa,
where the energy intensity of GDP tends to be relatively high. The relative price movements
highlighted by Paltsev point to a choice between less and less use of increasingly cheap fossil
fuels or more and more use of increasingly expensive fossil fuels. While projecting the future
level of prices of fossil fuels is intrinsically difficult, it should be possible to build upon the
work by Paltsev to consider the implications of mitigation for fossil fuel prices in greater detail.
This work would usefully be married to country level work on the implications of these price
changes for living standards in developing countries.
Finally, more work is required on the relative competitiveness of developing regions
under mitigation regimes. As shown by Lanz and Rausch (2011), typical parameterizations
of the power sector in workhorse models of global trade do a poor job of emulating actual
technical choices including for renewables. To the knowledge of the authors, there has yet to
be a rigorous consideration of the relative benefits of Africa’s substantial endowments of sun,
wind, and hydropower resources in a world characterized by an effective mitigation regime.
They could turn out to be large and therefore deserve close scrutiny to the benefit of a
continent where the effects of climate change are otherwise unfavorable, as illustrated in
what follows.
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